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We  study  the  stability  of  social  and  economic  networks  when  players  are  farsighted.  In 
particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from 
those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's Games 
and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first 
investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise 
farsightedly  stable  sets  of  networks  coincide  with  the  set  of  pairwise  (myopically)  stable 
networks  and  the  set  of  strongly  efficient  networks.  We  then  provide  some  primitive 
conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks 
is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation 
rule,  the  set  of  strongly  efficient  networks  and  the  set  of  pairwise  (myopically)  stable 
networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable 
set if and only if the value function is top convex. 
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The organization of individual agents into networks and groups or coalitions plays
an important role in the determination of the outcome of many social and economic
interactions. For instance, networks of personal contacts are important in obtaining
information on goods and services, like product information or information about
job opportunities. Many commodities are traded through networks of buyers and
sellers. A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the
long run is to examine the requirement that individuals do not bene￿t from altering
the structure of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise stability
notion de￿ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no
individual bene￿ts from severing one of her links and no two individuals bene￿t
from adding a link between them, with one bene￿ting strictly and the other at least
weakly. Pairwise stability is a myopic de￿nition. Individuals are not forward-looking
in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. For
instance, the adding or severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or
severing of another link. If individuals have very good information about how others
might react to changes in the network, then these are things one wants to allow for
in the de￿nition of the stability concept. For instance, a network could be stable
because individuals might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the
current network, as that might in turn lead to the formation of other links and
ultimately lower the payo⁄s of the original individuals.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have proposed the notion of pairwise
farsightedly stable sets of networks that predicts which networks one might expect to
emerge in the long run when players are farsighted.1 A set of networks G is pairwise
farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g 2 G
to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse o⁄ or equally
well o⁄, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside
the set leading to some network in the set,2 and (iii) if there is no proper subset
1Jackson (2003, 2005) provides surveys of models of network formation. Other approaches
to farsightedness in network formation are suggested by the work of Chwe (1994), Xue (1998),
Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2004), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004), Page, Wooders
and Kamat (2005), Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005), and Page and Wooders (2009).
2A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or
sever links based on the improvement the end network o⁄ers relative to the current network. Each
1of G satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable
set always exists. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have provided a full
characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary
to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant
network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. They have also studied the relationship
between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise
consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.3
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate in some classi-
cal models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly sta-
ble sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks
and the set of strongly e¢ cient networks. We reconsider three classical models of
network formation: Jackson and Wolinsky￿ s (1996) symmetric connections model;
Corominas-Bosch￿ s (2004) model of trading networks with bilateral bargaining; and
Kranton and Minehart￿ s (2001) model of buyer-seller networks. We have chosen to
analyze those models because they have di⁄erent features. The symmetric connec-
tions model is a situation where homogeneous individuals obtain payo⁄s not only
from direct but also from indirect connections (where links represent social rela-
tionships between individuals such as friendships), while the models of buyer-seller
networks are situations where heterogeneous individuals (sellers and buyers) bargain
over prices for trade (where direct links are necessary for a transaction to occur).
We ￿nd that, in the symmetric connections model, myopic or farsighted notions of
stability do not diverge in terms of predictions. Therefore, farsightedness does not
eliminate the con￿ ict between stability and strong e¢ ciency that may occur when
costs are intermediate. In the bargaining model of Corominas-Bosch (2004), myopic
or farsighted notions of stability sustain the set of strongly e¢ cient networks when
the costs of maintaining links are not too large. In the Kranton and Minehart (2001)
model, pairwise farsighted stability may sustain the strongly e¢ cient network while
network in the sequence di⁄ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two
players involved must both prefer the end network to the current network, with at least one of the
two strictly preferring the end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of
the two players involved in the link strictly prefers the end network.
3Notice that any von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set is a pairwise far-
sightedly stable set. But, von Neumann-Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set may fail to
exist. Pairwise farsightedly stable sets have no relationship to either largest pairwise consistent
sets or sets of pairwise stable networks.
2pairwise (myopic) stability only sustains networks that are strongly ine¢ cient or
even Pareto dominated.
Second, we provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation
rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set. We ￿nd that, under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the
set of strongly e¢ cient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable net-
works that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. A value function is top
convex if some strongly e¢ cient network also maximizes the per capita value among
individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations
and basic properties and de￿nitions for networks. In Section 3 we de￿ne the notion
of pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks. In Section 4 we reconsider Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) symmetric connections model. In Section 5 we reconsider the
bargaining model of Corominas-Bosch (2004) and the Kranton and Minehart (2001)
model of buyer-seller networks. In Section 6 we look at the relationship between
farsighted stability and e¢ ciency of networks. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Networks
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the ￿nite set of players who are connected in some net-
work relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus
modeled as a non-directed graph. Individuals are the nodes in the graph and links
indicate bilateral relationships between individuals. Thus, a network g is simply
a list of which pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij 2 g to
indicate that i and j are linked under the network g. Let gN be the collection of
all subsets of N with cardinality 2, so gN is the complete network. The set of all
possible networks or graphs on N is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of gN:
The network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij
and the network that results from deleting link ij from an existing network g is
denoted g ￿ ij. For any network g, let N(g) = fi j 9j such that ij 2 gg be the
set of players who have at least one link in the network g. A path in a network
g 2 G between i and j is a sequence of players i1;:::;iK such that ikik+1 2 g for
each k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g with i1 = i and iK = j. A non-empty network h ￿ g is
3a component of g, if for all i 2 N(h) and j 2 N(h) n fig; there exists a path in h
connecting i and j, and for any i 2 N(h) and j 2 N(g), ij 2 g implies ij 2 h. The
set of components of g is denoted by C(g). Knowing the components of a network,
we can partition the players into groups within which players are connected. Let
￿(g) denote the partition of N induced by the network g.4
A value function is a function v : G ! R that keeps track of how the total
societal value varies across di⁄erent networks. The set of all possible value functions
is denoted by V. An allocation rule is a function Y : G ￿ V ! RN that keeps
track of how the value is allocated among the players forming a network. It satis￿es
P
i2N Yi(g;v) = v(g) for all v and g.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have proposed a number of basic properties of value
functions and allocation rules. A value function is component additive if v(g) =
P
h2C(g) v(h) for all g 2 G. Component additive value functions are the ones for
which the value of a network is the sum of the value of its components. An allocation
rule Y is component balanced if for any component additive v 2 V, g 2 G, and
h 2 C(g), we have
P
i2N(h) Yi(h;v) = v(h). Component balancedness only puts
conditions on Y for v￿ s that are component additive, so Y can be arbitrary otherwise.
Given a permutation of players ￿ and any g 2 G, let g￿ = f￿(i)￿(j) j ij 2 gg. Thus,
g￿ is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation of the players. A value
function is anonymous if for any permutation ￿ and any g 2 G, v(g￿) = v(g).
Given a permutation ￿, let v￿ be de￿ned by v￿(g) = v(g￿￿1) for each g 2 G. An
allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v 2 V, g 2 G, and permutation ￿, we have
Y￿(i)(g￿;v￿) = Yi(g;v).
An allocation rule that is component balanced and anonymous is the componen-
twise egalitarian allocation rule. For a component additive v and network g, the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce is such that for any h 2 C(g) and
each i 2 N(h), Y ce
i (g;v) = v(h)=#N(h). For a v that is not component additive,
Y ce(g;v) = v(g)=n for all g; thus, Y ce splits the value v(g) equally among all players
if v is not component additive.
In evaluating societal welfare, we may take various perspectives. A network g
is Pareto e¢ cient relative to v and Y if there does not exist any g0 2 G such that
Yi(g0;v) ￿ Yi(g;v) for all i with at least one strict inequality. A network g 2 G is
4Throughout the paper we use the notation ￿ for weak inclusion and   for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality.
4strongly e¢ cient relative to v if v(g) ￿ v(g0) for all g0 2 G. This is a strong notion
of e¢ ciency as it takes the perspective that value is fully transferable.
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the
long run is to examine the requirement that agents do not bene￿t from altering
the structure of the network. A weak version of such a condition is the pairwise
stability notion de￿ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise
stable if no player bene￿ts from severing one of her links and no two players bene￿t
from adding a link between them, with one bene￿ting strictly and the other at least
weakly. Formally, a network g is pairwise stable with respect to value function v
and allocation rule Y if
(i) for all ij 2 g, Yi(g;v) ￿ Yi(g ￿ ij;v) and Yj(g;v) ￿ Yj(g ￿ ij;v), and
(ii) for all ij = 2 g, if Yi(g;v) < Yi(g + ij;v) then Yj(g;v) > Yj(g + ij;v).
3 Pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks
A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players
form or sever links based on the improvement the end network o⁄ers relative to the
current network. Each network in the sequence di⁄ers by one link from the previous
one. If a link is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end
network to the current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the
end network. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players
involved in the link strictly prefers the end network. We now introduce the formal
de￿nition of a farsighted improving path.
De￿nition 1. A farsighted improving path from a network g to a network g0 6= g
is a ￿nite sequence of graphs g1;:::;gK with g1 = g and gK = g0 such that for any
k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g either:
(i) gk+1 = gk￿ij for some ij such that Yi(gK;v) > Yi(gk;v) or Yj(gK;v) > Yj(gk;v),
or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that Yi(gK;v) > Yi(gk;v) and Yj(gK;v) ￿
Yj(gk;v).
5If there exists a farsighted improving path from g to g0, then we write g ! g0.
For a given network g, let F(g) = fg0 2 G j g ! g0g. This is the set of networks that
can be reached by a farsighted improving path from g. Thus, g ! g0 means that g0
is the endpoint of at least one farsighted improving path from g: Notice that F(g)
may contain many networks and that a network g0 2 F(g) might be the endpoint of
several farsighted improving paths starting in g.
We now introduce a solution concept due to Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2009), the pairwise farsightedly stable set.
De￿nition 2. A set of networks G ￿ G is pairwise farsightedly stable with respect
v and Y if
(i) 8 g 2 G,
(ia) 8 ij = 2 g such that g+ij = 2 G, 9g0 2 F(g+ij)\G such that (Yi(g0;v);Yj(g0,
v)) = (Yi(g;v);Yj(g;v)) or Yi(g0;v) < Yi(g;v) or Yj(g0;v) < Yj(g;v),
(ib) 8 ij 2 g such that g ￿ ij = 2 G, 9g0;g00 2 F(g ￿ ij) \ G such that
Yi(g0;v) ￿ Yi(g;v) and Yj(g00;v) ￿ Yj(g;v),
(ii) 8g0 2 G n G; F(g0) \ G 6= ;:
(iii) @ G0   G such that G0 satis￿es Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii).
Condition (i) in De￿nition 2 requires the deterrence of external deviations. Con-
dition (ia) captures that adding a link ij to a network g 2 G that leads to a network
outside of G; is deterred by the threat of ending in g0: Here g0 is such that there
is a farsighted improving path from g + ij to g0: Moreover, g0 belongs to G; which
makes g0 a credible threat. Condition (ib) is a similar requirement, but then for the
case where a link is severed. Condition (ii) in De￿nition 2 requires external stability
and implies that the networks within the set are robust to perturbations. From any
network outside of G there is a farsighted improving path leading to some network
in G. Condition (ii) implies that if a set of networks is pairwise farsightedly sta-
ble, it is non-empty. Notice that the set G (trivially) satis￿es Conditions (ia), (ib),
and (ii) in De￿nition 2. This motivates the requirement of a minimality condition,
namely Condition (iii). Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have shown
that a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks always exists.
6A network g strictly Pareto dominates all other networks if g is such that for all
g0 2 G n fgg it holds that, for all i, Yi(g;v) > Yi(g0;v). Although the network that
strictly Pareto dominates all others is pairwise stable, there might be many more
pairwise stable networks. Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have shown
that, if there is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then
fgg is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Thus, pairwise farsighted stability
singles out the Pareto dominating network as the unique pairwise farsightedly stable
set.
4 The symmetric connections model
In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) symmetric connections model, players form links
with each other in order to exchange information. If player i is connected to player j
by a path of t links, then player i receives a payo⁄of ￿
t from her indirect connection
with player j. It is assumed that 0 < ￿ < 1, and so the payo⁄ ￿
t decreases as
the path connecting players i and j increases; thus information that travels a long
distance becomes diluted and is less valuable than information obtained from a closer
neighbor. Each direct link ij results in a cost c to both i and j. This cost can be
interpreted as the time a player must spend with another player in order to maintain









where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting
t(ij) = 1 if there is no path between i and j). Let g￿ denote a star network
encompassing everyone and g? be the empty network (no links).
Proposition 1 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Take the symmetric connections
model. The unique strongly e¢ cient network is (i) the complete network gN if c <
￿(1￿￿), (ii) a star encompassing everyone if ￿(1￿￿) < c < ￿ +((n￿2)=2)￿
2, and
(iii) the empty network if ￿ + ((n ￿ 2)=2)￿
2 < c.
Proposition 2 (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Take the symmetric connections
model. For c < ￿(1￿￿), the unique pairwise stable network is the complete network
gN. For ￿(1 ￿ ￿) < c < ￿, a star encompassing all players is pairwise stable, but
not necessarily the unique pairwise stable network. For ￿ < c, any pairwise stable
7network which is non-empty is such that each player has at least two links and thus
is ine¢ cient.
These two results show that there is a con￿ ict between e¢ ciency and pairwise
stability for a large range of the parameters. Indeed, only for c < ￿(1 ￿ ￿), there is
no con￿ ict between the e¢ cient and the pairwise stable networks. When ￿(1￿￿) <
c < ￿, the e¢ cient network is pairwise stable, but there are other pairwise stable
networks that are not e¢ cient. For ￿ < c < ￿ + ((n ￿ 2)=2)￿
2, the e¢ cient network
is never pairwise stable. And, ￿nally, for ￿+((n￿2)=2)￿
2 < c, the e¢ cient network
is pairwise stable, but there could be other pairwise stable networks that are not
e¢ cient.
Proposition 3. Take the symmetric connections model.
(i) For c < ￿(1￿￿), a set consisting of the complete network, fgNg, is the unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(ii) For ￿(1 ￿ ￿) < c < ￿, every set consisting of a star network encompassing all
players, fg￿g, is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks, but they are not
necessarily the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
(iii) For c > ￿, a set consisting of the empty network, fg?g, is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set if c > ￿ +((n￿2)=2)￿
2. Otherwise, if ￿ < c < ￿ +((n￿
2)=2)￿
2, fg?g is not necessarily the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
Proof.
(i) Assume c < ￿(1￿￿). Since ￿ < 1, we have that (￿ ￿c) > ￿
2 > ￿
3 > ::: > ￿
n￿1.
Thus, any two players who are not directly connected bene￿t from forming a
link. In this case, the complete network gN strictly Pareto dominates all other
networks. That is, for every g 2 GngN we have that, for all i, Yi(gN) > Yi(g).
Theorem 7 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) states that if there
is a network g that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then fgg is
the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Hence, we have that fgNg is the
unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(ii) Assume ￿(1 ￿ ￿) < c < ￿. Since ￿
2 > (￿ ￿ c), and ￿
2 > ￿
3 > ::: > ￿
n￿1, each
player prefers an indirect link at a distance of two to any direct link and to any
8indirect link at a distance greater than two. In a star network encompassing
all players g￿ there is n ￿ 1 links connecting one given player i to any other
player j 2 N, j 6= i. Denote i(g￿) the hub player at the star g￿. The payo⁄
of the hub player i(g￿) is Yi(g￿) = (n ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ c) and the payo⁄ of any spoke
player j, j 6= i(g￿), is Yj(g￿) = (￿￿c)+(n￿2)￿
2. Notice that the payo⁄of the
spoke players is the maximum payo⁄ a player can get in any network g 2 G.
Using Theorem 4 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which says
that the set fgg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if for every
g0 2 G n fgg we have g 2 F(g0), we will prove that every set consisting of a
star network encompassing all players fg￿g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set
since g￿ 2 F(g) for any g 6= g￿.
(ii.a) Consider ￿rst any network g containing at most n￿1 links. Starting from the
empty network g?, it is straightforward to construct a farsightedly improving
path leading to g￿ so that g￿ 2 F(g?). Take the hub player i and any other
player and form the link between them. Then, add successively the links be-
tween the hub player and any other player until g￿ is formed. Starting from
any other network g with k ￿ n￿1 links, if g is another star (g 6= g￿) encom-
passing all players, let the hub player at g, i(g), delete a link. Otherwise, if
g is not a star encompassing all players, let any linked player j 6= i(g￿) delete
one link. In the next steps, any linked player di⁄erent than i(g￿) cuts one link
until the empty network g? is reached. From g?, add successively the links
between player i(g￿) and the rest of the players until g￿ is formed. Obviously,
g￿ 2 F(g) because every deviating player prefers g￿ to the network they were
facing before deviating in order to end up at g￿.
(ii.b) Consider next any network g containing more than n￿1 links. In such network
g, there is always at least a player j 6= i(g￿) with more than one direct link and
that would like to move to g￿. From g, let one of such players delete one of her
links. If the resulting network has still more than n ￿ 1 links, choose again a
player l 6= i(g￿) with more than one direct link and let her delete one link. The
process continue until we reach at some point a network g0 with n￿1 links. If
g0 = g￿, we stop here. If g0 is another star (g0 6= g￿) encompassing all players,
let the hub player at g0, i(g0), delete a link. If g0 is not a star encompassing all
players, let any linked player j 6= i(g￿) delete one link. In the next steps, any
9linked player di⁄erent than i(g￿) cuts one link until the empty network g? is
reached. From g?, add successively the links between player i(g￿) and the rest
of the players until g￿ is formed. Thus, g￿ 2 F(g) and Theorem 4 in Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies.
(ii.c) It is straightforward to verify that, for n = 4, sets consisting of a star network
encompassing all players are not the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
For instance, if ￿(1 ￿ ￿
2) < c < ￿, a set consisting of all lines where players
get identical payo⁄s is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. If ￿(1 ￿ ￿) < c <
￿(1 ￿ ￿
2), a set consisting of all circles is a pairwise farsightedly stable set.
(iii.a) Assume ￿rst that c > ￿ +((n￿2)=2)￿
2. In order to show that a set consisting
of the empty network (with a payo⁄of 0 for all players) is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set of networks, we need to show that Corollary 1 in Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies. That is, we need to show that
g? 2 F(g) for all g 6= g? and that F(g?) = ?. Since c > ￿ + ((n ￿ 2)=2)￿
2,
the empty network g? is the unique strongly e¢ cient network. This implies
that in any other network g, there is some player with a negative payo⁄ that
prefers the empty network and hence, we have that g = 2 F(g?). Now, from g,
let one of the players with a negative payo⁄ delete one of her links. Since in
any resulting network g0 there is some player preferring the empty network, by
letting one of such players deleting one of her links at each step, we ￿nally end
up at the empty network g?, and g? 2 F(g). Thus, g? 2 F(g) for all g 6= g?
and Corollary 1 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies.
(iii.b) Assume now that ￿ < c < ￿ + ((n ￿ 2)=2)￿
2. In this case, the empty network
is no more the strongly e¢ cient network (a star encompassing everyone is the
strongly e¢ cient network). However, there are still some parameter values for
which a set consisting of the empty network, fg?g, is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set. Indeed, the necessary and su¢ cient condition in order to have that
g? 2 F(g) for all g 6= g? is that mini Yi(g) < 0 for all g 6= g?. That is, in
every g 6= g?, there should be a player with a negative payo⁄ that would like
to move to g? (and then notice that every g 6= g? is such that g = 2 F(g?)).
From any g 6= g?, let at each step one of the players obtaining a negative
payo⁄delete one of her links until g? is reached. Thus, Corollary 1 in Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) applies, and fg?g is the unique pairwise
10farsightedly stable set. Notice that the above condition holds for values of
c < ￿ + ((n ￿ 2)=2)￿
2. On the contrary, if mini Yi(g) ￿ 0 for all i for some
g 6= g?, we have that g? = 2 F(g) and then fg?g is not a pairwise farsightedly
stable set. However, it may happen that a set of networks containing among
others the empty network is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks.5
Proposition 3 shows that replacing myopic by farsighted players in the symmetric
connections model does not eliminate the con￿ ict between strong e¢ ciency and sta-
bility but, sometimes, it may help to reduce it. For instance, when ￿+((n￿2)=2)￿
2 <
c, a set consisting of the unique strongly e¢ cient network is the unique pairwise far-
sightedly stable set while other networks may be pairwise stable. Regarding the
relationship between pairwise stability and pairwise farsighted stability, we observe
that the concept of pairwise stability is quite robust to the introduction of farsighted
players because, for a large range of parameters, we have that pairwise stable net-
works belong to pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Watts (2001) has analyzed the process of network formation in a dynamic frame-
work where pairs of myopic players meet and decide whether or not to form or sever
links with each other based on the improvement the resulting network o⁄ers relative
to the current network. If the bene￿t from maintaining an indirect link is greater
than the net bene￿t from maintaining a direct link (case (ii) of Proposition 3), then
it is di¢ cult for the strongly e¢ cient network (which is the star network) to form.
In fact, starting at the empty network, the strongly e¢ cient network only forms if
the order in which the players meet takes a particular pattern. Moreover, as the
number of players increases it becomes less likely that the strongly e¢ cient network
forms. These results contrast with ours, for such parameter values, since every set
consisting of a star network is a pairwise farsightedly stable set whatever the num-
ber of farsighted players. Thus, it is not unlikely that forward looking players will
increase the chances of the star forming.
5 Buyer-seller networks
Corominas-Bosch (2004) has developed a simple model of trading networks with
bilateral bargaining. The market consists of s sellers 1;2;:::;s and b buyers s+1;s+
5For instance, in case of four players the set consisting of g?, f12;13;34g and f14;13;32g is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set.
112;:::;s+b. We denote the set of buyers as B and the set of sellers as S. Each seller
owns a single object to sell that has no value to the seller. Buyers have a valuation
of 1 for an object and do not care from whom they purchase the good. If a seller
and a buyer trade at price p, the seller receives a payo⁄ of p and the buyer a payo⁄
of 1￿p. Agents are embedded in a network that links sellers and buyers, and trade
is only possible among linked agents. That is, a link in the network represents the
opportunity for a buyer and a seller to bargain and potentially exchange an object.6
Let G(S;B) = fg 2 G j ij 2 g , i 2 S and j 2 Bg be the set of feasible buyer-seller
networks. Agents incur a cost of maintaining each link equal to cs for sellers and to
cb for buyers. So the payo⁄to an agent is her payo⁄from any trade on the network,
less the cost of maintaining any links that she is involved with.
In the ￿rst period sellers simultaneously call out prices. A buyer can only se-
lect from the prices that she has heard called out by the sellers to whom she is
linked. Buyers simultaneously respond by either choosing to accept a single price
o⁄er received or rejecting all price o⁄ers received.7 At the end of the period, trades
are made and buyers and sellers who have traded are cleared from the market. In
the next period the situation reverses and buyers call out prices. These are then
either accepted or rejected by the sellers connected to them. Each period the role of
proposer and responder alternates and this process repeats itself until all remaining
buyers and sellers are not linked to each other. Buyers and sellers are impatient so
that a transaction at price p in period t is worth ￿
tp to a seller and ￿
t(1 ￿ p) to a
buyer with 0 < ￿ < 1 being the common discount factor. In a subgame perfect equi-
librium with very patient agents (￿ close to 1), there are e⁄ectively three possible
outcomes for any given agent (ignoring the costs of maintaining links): either she
gets all the available gains from trade (1), or half of the gains from trade (1=2), or
none of the available gains from trade (0). Corominas-Bosch (2004) has provided
an algorithm that subdivides any network into three types of subnetworks: those in
which a set of sellers are collectively linked to a larger set of buyers (sellers obtain 1
6A link is necessary between a buyer and a seller for a transaction to occur, but if an agent has
several links, then there are several possible trading patterns. The network structure essentially
determines the bargaining power of buyers and sellers.
7If there are several sellers who have called out the same price and/or several buyers who have
accepted the same price, and there is any discretion under the given network connections as to
which trades should occur, then there is a careful protocol for determining which trades occur.
The protocol is essentially designed to maximize the number of transactions.
12as payo⁄s, and buyers receive 0); those in which the collective set of sellers is linked
to the same-sized collective set of buyers (each receives 1=2); and those in which
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Figure 2 : Limit payo⁄s in the Corominas-Bosch (2004) model for some networks.
Let G2 be the set of all buyer-seller networks consisting of pairs and so that the
maximum number of potential pairs must form. That is, G2 = fg 2 G(S;B) j l(g) =
minf#S;#Bg and li(g) ￿ 1 8i 2 S [Bg where l(g) is the number of links in g and
li(g) is the number of links player i has in g.
Proposition 4 (Jackson, 2003). In the Corominas-Bosch model with 1=2 > cs > 0
and 1=2 > cb > 0, the set of pairwise stable networks is G2 which is exactly the set
of strongly e¢ cient networks.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. An agent having a payo⁄ of 0
cannot have any links since by deleting a link she could save the link cost and not
lose any bene￿t. So, all agents who have links must obtain payo⁄s of 1=2 (ignoring
8The algorithm works as follows. Step 1a: Identify groups of two or more sellers who are
all linked only to the same buyer. Regardless of that buyer￿ s other connections, eliminate that
set of sellers and buyer (with the buyer obtaining 1 and the sellers receiving 0). Step 1b: On the
remaining network, repeat step 1a but with the role of buyers and sellers reversed. Step k: Proceed
inductively in k, each time identifying subsets of at least k sellers who are collectively linked to
some set of fewer-than-k buyers, or some collection of at least k buyers who are collectively linked
to some set of fewer-than-k sellers. End: When all such subgraphs are removed, the buyers and
sellers in the remaining network are such that every subset of sellers is linked to at least as many
buyers and vice versa, and the buyers and sellers in that subnetwork get 1=2.
13the costs of maintaining links). Then, we can show that if there are extra links in
such a network relative to the strongly e¢ cient network which consists of a maximal
number of disjoint linked pairs, some links could be deleted without changing the
payo⁄s from trade but saving link costs. Thus, a pairwise stable network must
consist of linked pairs, and the maximum number of potential pairs must form.
Notice that if 1=2 < cs and/or 1=2 < cb then the empty network is the unique
pairwise stable network. The empty network is strongly e¢ cient only if cs +cb ￿ 1.
Let B = f e B ￿ B j # e B = minf#S;#Bgg and S = fe S ￿ S j #e S =
minf#S;#Bgg. Given e B 2 B and e S 2 S, let G2( e B; e S) = fg 2 G(S;B) j l(g) =
minf#S;#Bg, li(g) = 1 8i 2 e S [ e B, and li(g) = 0 8i = 2 e S [ e Bg. Of course,
G2( e B; e S) ￿ G2.
Proposition 5. In the Corominas-Bosch model with 1=2 > cs > 0 and 1=2 > cb > 0,
for all e B 2 B and e S 2 S, the set G2( e B; e S) is a pairwise farsightedly stable set of
networks.
Proof. Take any e B 2 B and e S 2 S. First, we show that for every g0 = 2 G2( e B; e S)
there is g 2 G2( e B; e S) such that g 2 F(g0). Notice that, for every g 2 G2( e B; e S),
each agent receives either Yi(g) = 1=2 ￿ ci > 0 if agent i is linked to another agent
or Yi(g) = 0 if agent i has no link, and Yi(g1) = Yi(g2) for all g1;g2 2 G2( e B; e S),
for all i 2 N. Start with g0 and build a sequence of networks where at each step
some agent (who is looking forward to g) deletes a link until we reach a network g00
consisting only of linked pairs of agents and/or agents having no links. Then, agents
successively add the links that belong to g but do not belong to g00. Finally, at each
following step some agent who has two links at the current network, one link with
her partner in g and one link with another partner, deletes the latter link until we
reach the network g.
Step 1a: Agents who receive a payo⁄ strictly less than 0 successively delete a
link. Each agent is willing to delete a link looking forward to g since Yi(g) ￿ 0 for
all i 2 S [ B. Step 1b: On the remaining network, delete a link from an agent who
receives a payo⁄of 1=2￿lici with li > 1 and who obtains a payo⁄of 1=2￿ci at the
endpoint g. Step k: Proceed inductively in k, agents who receive a payo⁄ strictly
less than 0 successively delete a link; then, on the remaining network, delete a link
from an agent who receives a payo⁄of 1=2￿lici with li > 1 and who obtains a payo⁄
of 1=2 ￿ ci at the endpoint g. Step K: When all such links are removed, we end up
14at a network g00 2 fg 2 G(S;B) j l(g) ￿ minf#S;#Bg and li(g) ￿ 1 8i 2 S [ Bg
where all the buyers and sellers in g00 that do have a link get a payo⁄of 1=2￿ci while
the others get 0. If g00 2 G2( e B; e S) we stop here. Otherwise, select g 2 G2( e B; e S)
such that g \g00 ￿ e g \g00 for all e g 2 G2( e B; e S). Step K +1: Agents successively add
the links that belong to g but do not belong to g00. That is, a pair of agents i and
j will add the link ij so that ij 2 g and ij = 2 g00. Since at least one of the agent
has no link at g00, say agent i (li(g00) = 0), then Yi(g00) = 0 < Yi(g) = 1=2 ￿ ci, and
so agent i is willing to add the link. The other agent (agent j) has either no link
(which gives her a payo⁄ of 0) or has one link (which gives her a payo⁄ of 1=2￿cj)
and so she agrees to add the link with agent i since Yj(g00) ￿ Yj(g). When all such
links are added, we end up at a network g000. Step K + 2: Agents that have a link
in g00 but do not have a link in g are linked in g000 to some agent who has two links
in g000 and so obtain a payo⁄ of 0 ￿ ci. Those agents successively delete their links
looking forward to g. When all such links are removed, we end up at the network g.
Second, we show that for every g 2 G2( e B; e S) we have that F(g)\G2( e B; e S) = ?.
Since Yi(g1) = Yi(g2) for all g1;g2 2 G2( e B; e S) and for all i 2 S [ B, it follows that
g1 = 2 F(g2). Theorem 3 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) states that if
for every g0 2 GnG we have F(g0)\G 6= ; and for every g 2 G; F(g)\G = ;, then
G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. Hence, we have that G2( e B; e S) is a pairwise
farsightedly stable set.
Proposition 6. In the Corominas-Bosch model with 1=2 > cs > 0 and 1=2 > cb > 0,
there does not exist a pairwise farsightedly stable set G such that G \ G2 = ?.
Proof. We will show that for all g0 = 2 G2 and for all g 2 G2 we have that g0 = 2 F(g)
which guarantees that there does not exist a pairwise farsightedly stable set G such
that G\G2 = ?. The only networks g0 = 2 G2 that some forward looking agents may
prefer to g 2 G2 are such that the agents deviating from g obtain a payo⁄ of 1 in
g0 (ignoring the costs of maintaining links). To obtain 1 the deviating agents will
have to form links along the sequence with agents that will obtain 0 in g0 (ignoring
the costs of maintaining links). But, before forming these additional links with the
original deviating agents, these agents have a payo⁄ of either 1=2 or 0 (ignoring the
costs of maintaining links), and thus, they have incentives to block the formation of
any additional costly link.
In the bargaining model of Corominas-Bosch (2004) myopic or farsighted notions
15of stability sustain the set of strongly e¢ cient networks when the costs of maintaining
links are not too large. Notice that if 1=2 < cs and/or 1=2 < cb then a set consisting
of the empty network is obviously the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. In
that case, on at least one side of the market (buyers or sellers) agents who have
some link in any network receive a payo⁄strictly less than 0 and thus are willing to
delete their links looking forward to the empty network. It also implies that there
are no farsighted improving path emanating from the empty network.
The Kranton and Minehart (2001) model of buyer-seller networks is similar to
the Corominas-Bosch model except that the valuations of the buyers for an object
are random and the determination of prices is made through an auction rather
than alternating-o⁄er bargaining. Consider a version of the model with one seller
(#S = 1) and some potential buyers (#B ￿ 1). So, there is one seller who has an
indivisible object for sale and b potential buyers who have utilities for the object,
denoted ui, which are uniformly and independently distributed on [0;1]. The object
to sell has no value to the seller. Each buyer knows her own valuation, but only the
distribution over the buyers￿valuations. The seller also knows only the distribution
of buyers￿valuations. The object is sold by means of a standard second-price auction.
Only the buyers who are linked to the seller participate to the auction. The number
of buyers linked to the seller is given by l(g). For a cost per link of cs to the seller
and cb to the buyer, the allocation rule for any network g with l(g) ￿ 1 links between






l(g)(l(g)+1) ￿ cb if i is a linked buyer
l(g)￿1
l(g)+1 ￿ l(g)cs if i is the seller
0 if i is a buyer without any links.
,
The value function is v(g) =
l(g)
l(g)+1 ￿l(g)(cs+cb), which is simply the expected value
of the object to the highest valued buyer less the cost of links. Let l￿
s be the number
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which is the optimal number of links for the seller. Let l￿
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16which is the maximal number of links up to which buyers make positive payo⁄s. A
network g such that l(g) = minfl￿
s;l￿







b+1) = cb and l￿
s = l￿
b then g ￿ ij such that l(g) = minfl￿
s;l￿
bg is pairwise stable
too. Strongly e¢ cient networks are not necessarily pairwise stable.9 If cs = 0 then
the pairwise stable networks are exactly the e¢ cient ones.
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b then fgg with g 2 G1 = fg 2
G(f1g;B) j l(g) = minfl￿
s;l￿




s+1) = cs, 1
l￿
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b+1) = cb and l￿
s = l￿
b then G1 [ fgg with g 2 G￿1 = fg 2
G(f1g;B) j l(g) = l￿
s ￿ 1g are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
Proof. (i) Suppose 2
l￿
s(l￿
s+1) > cs and/or 1
l￿
b(l￿
b+1) > cb and/or l￿
s 6= l￿
b; and let G1 =
fg 2 G(f1g;B) j l(g) = minfl￿
s;l￿
bgg. It is quite straightforward that (a) g0 = 2 F(g)
for all g0 = 2 G1 and g 2 G1; (b) g0 2 F(g) for all g;g0 2 G1; (c) g 2 F(g0) for all





s+1) = cs, 1
l￿
b(l￿
b+1) = cb and l￿
s = l￿
b. Let G￿1 = fg 2 G(f1g;B) j
l(g) = l￿
s ￿ 1g. We have Ys(g) = Ys(g0) for all g;g0 2 G1 [ G￿1; Yi(g) = 0 for all
g 2 G1, i 2 B; Yi(g) = 0 for all g 2 G￿1, i 2 B with li(g) = 0. It follows that (a)
g0 = 2 F(g) for all g;g0 2 G1 [ fg00g with g00 2 G￿1; (b) for all g0 = 2 G1 [ fg00g with
g00 2 G￿1 there is g 2 F(g0) such that g 2 G1 [ fg00g with g00 2 G￿1; (c) g0 = 2 F(g)
for all g0 = 2 G1 [ G￿1 and g 2 G1 [ G￿1. (a) and (b) imply that G1 [ fg00g with
g00 2 G￿1 is a pairwise farsightedly stable set while (c) implies that G1 [ fg00g with
g00 2 G￿1 are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets.
While the pairwise (myopically or farsightedly) stable networks may not be
strongly e¢ cient, they are Pareto e¢ cient. However, when there are more sell-
ers it is possible for non-trivial pairwise (myopically) stable networks to be Pareto
ine¢ cient. Consider a population with two sellers and four buyers. Let agents 1 and
2 be the sellers and 3, 4, 5 and 6 be the buyers. Some straightforward but tedious
calculations lead to the payo⁄s which are given in Figure 3 and Figure 4 for selected
networks.
9For instance, if cs = cb = 1=100 then the pairwise stable networks have 10 links, while networks
with only 6 links are the strongly e¢ cient ones.
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Figure 3 : Payo⁄s in the Kranton and Minehart (2001) model for selected networks.
For instance, when cs = 5=60 and cb = 1=60, there are three types of pair-
wise stable networks: the empty network, networks that look like f13;14;15;16g,
and networks that look like f13;14;15;24;25;26g. Both the empty network and
f13;14;15;24;25;26g are not Pareto e¢ cient, while f13;14;15;16g is. The empty
network and the network f13;14;15;24;25;26g are Pareto dominated by the network
f13;14;25;26g. In addition, the network f13;14;15;16g is not strongly e¢ cient. The
network f13;14;25;26g is strongly e¢ cient but is not pairwise stable since agents 1
and 5 have incentives to add a link. However, the network f13;14;25;26g is pair-
wise farsightedly stable. Indeed, we have that G0 = fg j d1(g) = d2(g) = 2 and
d3(g) = d4(g) = d5(g) = d6(g) = 1g is a pairwise farsightedly stable set since for
every g0 = 2 G0 we have F(g0) \ G0 6= ? and for every g 2 G0, F(g) \ G0 = ?. Thus,
contrary to pairwise stability, pairwise farsighted stability may sustain strongly ef-
18￿cient networks when there are more than one seller. One open question is whether
Pareto ine¢ cient networks could belong to some pairwise farsightedly stable set with
many sellers and buyers.
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Figure 4 : Payo⁄s in the Kranton and Minehart (2001) model for selected networks (continued).
6 Farsighted stability and e¢ ciency
6.1 Primitive conditions on value functions
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) have shown that the set of pairwise
farsightedly stable networks and the set of strongly e¢ cient networks, those which
are socially optimal, may be disjoint for all allocation rules that are component
balanced and anonymous. However, as already mentioned, if there is a network g
19that strictly Pareto dominates all other networks, then fgg is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set. Suppose that Y is the egalitarian allocation rule and E(v) is
the set of strongly e¢ cient networks. Then, E(v) is the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set.
We now provide some alternative primitive conditions on value functions and
allocation rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set. It will turn out that under the conditions we will impose
the notion of pairwise farsighted stability re￿nes the notion of pairwise stability by
eliminating the ine¢ cient pairwise stable networks.
A value function v is top convex if some strongly e¢ cient network also maximizes
the per capita value among players. Let gS be the collection of all subsets of S ￿ N
with cardinality 2. Let ￿(v;S) = maxg￿gS v(g)=#S. The value function v is top
convex if ￿(v;N) ￿ ￿(v;S) for all S ￿ N.
Proposition 8. Consider any anonymous and component additive value function
v. The set of strongly e¢ cient networks E(v) is the unique pairwise farsightedly
stable set under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce if and only if v is
top convex.
Proof. Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v. (() Top
convexity implies that all components of a strongly e¢ cient network must lead to
the same per-capita value (if some component led to a lower per capita value than
the average, then another component would have to lead to a higher per capita value
than the average which would contradict top convexity). It follows that under the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule any g 2 E(v) Pareto dominates all g0 = 2
E(v). Then, it is immediate that g 2 F(g0) for all g0 2 GnE(v) and that F(g) = ?.
Using Theorem 5 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which says that G
is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if G = fg 2 G j F(g) = ?g
and for every g0 2 G n G, F(g0) \ G 6= ?, we have that E(v) is the unique pairwise
farsightedly stable set.
()) Since E(v) is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set, we have F(g) = ?
for all g 2 E(v). It follows that under the componentwise egalitarian allocation
rule (i) Y ce
i (g;v) = Y ce
j (g;v) = Y ce
i (g0;v) = Y ce
j (g0;v) for all i;j 2 N and for all
g;g0 2 E(v); (ii) Y ce
i (g;v) ￿ Y ce
i (g0;v) for all i 2 N, for all g 2 E(v), for all
g0 = 2 E(v). Thus, v is top convex.
20Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) have shown that the set of strongly
e¢ cient networks coincides with the set of strongly stable networks under the com-
ponentwise egalitarian allocation rule if and only if v is top convex.10 Hence, the
set of strongly stable networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set under
the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule if and only if the value function is
top convex. So, pairwise farsighted stability selects under Y ce the pairwise stable
networks that are immune to coalitional deviations if and only if v is top convex.
Note that top convexity is a condition that is satis￿ed in some natural situations.
For instance, the value function of the symmetric connections model is top convex
for all values of ￿ 2 [0;1) and c ￿ 0, so that all strongly e¢ cient networks with
respect to v form the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set with respect to Y ce and
v.11
6.2 Strict or weak deviations
It is customary to require that a pair of players will deviate only if one player is
made better o⁄ and the other one at least equal o⁄ at the end network. In many
situations it should not be too di¢ cult for the player who is better at the end network
to convince the indi⁄erent player to join her to move towards this end network. For
instance, when small transfers between the deviating pair are allowed. The notion of
farsighted improving path given in De￿nition 1 captures this idea. But sometimes a
pair of players will deviate only if both are made better o⁄at the end network, since
changing the status-quo is costly, and players have to be compensated for doing so.
The notion of strict farsighted improving path captures this idea. Let us introduce
now a notion of pairwise farsighted stability that only accounts for deviations that
make all players strictly better o⁄.
10Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) have proposed a re￿nement of pairwise stability where
coalitionwise deviations are allowed: the strongly stable networks. A strongly stable network is a
network which is stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. Strongly stable
networks are Pareto e¢ cient and maximize the overall value of the network if the value of each
component of a network is allocated equally among the members of that component.
11Provided that n is even, the value function of Jackson and Wolinsky￿ s (1996) co-author model
is top convex as the strongly e¢ cient network always involves pairs of players who are linked to
each other. The value function of Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch￿ s (2009) criminal networks
model is top convex too. Finally, the value function of BramoullØ and Kranton￿ s (2007) risk sharing
networks model is top convex when the utility function is quadratic.
21De￿nition 3. A strict farsighted improving path from a network g to a network
g0 6= g is a ￿nite sequence of networks g1;:::;gK with g1 = g and gK = g0 such that
for any k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g either:
(i) gk+1 = gk￿ij for some ij such that Yi(gK;v) > Yi(gk;v) or Yj(gK;v) > Yj(gk;v),
or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that Yi(gK;v) > Yi(gk;v) and Yj(gK;v) >
Yj(gk;v).
For a given network g, let F s(g) be the set of networks that can be reached by
a strict farsighted improving path from g. We have that F s(g) ￿ F(g). We now
introduce the concept of strict pairwise farsightedly stable set based on the notion
of strict improving path.
De￿nition 4. A set of networks G ￿ G is a strict pairwise farsightedly stable set
with respect v and Y if
(i) 8 g 2 G,
(ia) 8 ij = 2 g such that g +ij = 2 G, 9g0 2 F s(g +ij)\G such that Yi(g0;v) ￿
Yi(g;v) or Yj(g0;v) ￿ Yj(g;v),
(ib) 8 ij 2 g such that g ￿ ij = 2 G, 9g0;g00 2 F s(g ￿ ij) \ G such that
Yi(g0;v) ￿ Yi(g;v) and Yj(g00;v) ￿ Yj(g;v),
(ii) 8g0 2 G n G; F s(g0) \ G 6= ;:
(iii) @ G0   G such that G0 satis￿es Conditions (ia), (ib), and (ii).
It is straightforward that if fgg is a strict pairwise farsightedly stable set then
fgg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set. The reverse is not true. However, if G is
a pairwise farsightedly stable set then (i) @G0 ￿ G such that G0 is a strict pairwise
farsightedly stable set, (ii) @G0 ￿ G such that G0 is a strict pairwise farsightedly
stable set as the following example shows.
Consider a situation with three players where the payo⁄s are given in Figure 5. It
can be veri￿ed that F(g0) = fg1;g3;g7g, F(g1) = fg0g, F(g2) = fg0;g1;g7g, F(g3) =
fg1;g6;g7g, F(g4) = fg0;g1;g7g, F(g5) = fg1;g3;g6;g7g, F(g6) = fg1;g7g, and
F(g7) = fg6g. Hence, the pairwise farsightedly stable sets are fg0;g7g, fg0;g3;g6g,
22fg1;g6g, fg1;g7g. It can also be veri￿ed that F s(g0) = ?, F s(g1) = fg0g, F s(g2) =
fg0;g1g, F s(g3) = ?, F s(g4) = fg0;g1g, F s(g5) = fg1;g3g, F s(g6) = ?, and F s(g7) =
fg6g. Hence, the unique strict pairwise farsightedly stable sets is fg0;g3;g6g, and














































































































Figure 6 : Strict versus weak pairwise farsighted stability: another example.
Consider another situation with three players where the payo⁄s are given in Fig-
ure 6. It can be veri￿ed that F(g0) = fg1;g3;g7g, F(g1) = fg0g, F(g2) = fg0;g1;g7g,
F(g3) = fg1;g7g, F(g4) = fg0;g1;g7g, F(g5) = fg1;g3;g4;g7g, F(g6) = fg1;g7g, and
F(g7) = fg4g. The pairwise farsightedly stable sets are fg0;g7g, fg0;g3;g4;g6g,
23fg1;g4g, fg1;g7g. It can also be veri￿ed that F s(g0) = ?, F s(g1) = fg0g, F s(g2) =
fg0;g1g, F s(g3) = ?, F s(g4) = fg0;g1g, F s(g5) = fg1;g3g, F s(g6) = fg1;g7g, and
F s(g7) = fg4g. Hence, the strict pairwise farsightedly stable sets are fg0;g3;g7g,
fg0;g3;g4;g6g, fg0;g1;g3;g4g. Thus, in general, there are no relationships between






be the network with the highest per capita value out of those that can be formed
by players in S ￿ N. Given a component additive value function v, ￿nd a network
gv through the following algorithm. Pick some h1 2 g(v;N). Next, pick some
h2 2 g(v;N n N(h1)). At stage k pick some hk 2 g(v;N n [i￿k￿1N(hi)). Since
N is ￿nite this process stops after a ￿nite number K of stages. The union of the
components picked in this way de￿nes a network gv. We denote by Gv the set of
all networks that can be found through this algorithm.12 More than one network
may be picked up through this algorithm since players may be permuted or even be
indi⁄erent between components of di⁄erent sizes.
Proposition 9. Consider any anonymous and component additive value function
v. The set Gv is the unique strict pairwise farsightedly stable set under the compo-
nentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce.
Proof. Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v. First we
show that F s(g) = ? for all g 2 Gv under the componentwise egalitarian allocation
rule Y ce. Take any g 2 Gv. Players belonging to N(h1) in g who are looking
forward will never engage in a move since they can never be strictly better o⁄ than
in g given the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce. Players belonging to
N(h2) in g who are forward looking will never engage in a move since the only
possibility to obtain a strictly higher payo⁄ is to end up in h1 (if h1 gives a strictly
higher payo⁄than h2) but players belonging to N(h1) will never engage a move. So,
players belonging to N(h2) can never end up strictly better o⁄ than in g given the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce. Players belonging to N(hk) in g who
are forward looking will never engage in a move since the only possibility to obtain
12This algorithm was ￿rst introduced by Banerjee (1999) who works with a notion of strong
stability but one that only accounts for deviations that make all players strictly better o⁄.
24a strictly higher payo⁄ is to end up in h1 or h2 ... or hk￿1 but players belonging to
[i￿k￿1N(hi) will never engage a move. So, players belonging N(hk) can never end
up strictly better o⁄ than in g given the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule
Y ce; and so on. Thus, F s(g) = ?.
Second, we show in a constructive way that for all g0 = 2 Gv there exists g 2 Gv
such that g 2 F s(g0) under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce. Take
any g0 = 2 Gv and g 2 Gv. In g0 all players are strictly worse o⁄ than the players
belonging to N(h1) in g under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce.
From g0, let the players who belong to N(h1) in g and are looking forward to g
￿rst deleting successively all their links and then building successively the links in
h1 (leading to g00 = g0 ￿ fij j i 2 N(h1)g + h1). Along the sequence from g0 to g00
all players who are moving always strictly prefer the end network g to the current
network. Once g00 (and h1) is formed, all the remaining players who are belonging
to N n N(h1) in g00 are strictly worse o⁄ than the players belonging to N(h2) in g.
From g00, let the players who belong to N(h2) in g and who are looking forward to
g ￿rst deleting successively all their links and then building successively the links in
h2 (leading to g000 = g0 ￿ fij j i 2 N(h1) [ N(h2)g + h1 + h2); and so on until we
reach the network g. Thus, we have build a strict farsighted improving path from
g0 to g; g 2 F s(g0).
Using Theorem 5 in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009) which says that
G is the unique (strict) pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if G = fg 2 G j
F s(g) = ?g and for every g0 2 GnG, F s(g0)\G 6= ?, we have that Gv is the unique
strict pairwise farsightedly stable set.
A network g is a strict pairwise stable network with respect to value function
v and allocation rule Y if (i) for all ij 2 g, Yi(g;v) ￿ Yi(g ￿ ij;v) and Yj(g;v) ￿
Yj(g ￿ ij;v), and (ii) for all ij = 2 g, if Yi(g;v) < Yi(g + ij;v) then Yj(g;v) ￿
Yj(g + ij;v). We have that all networks belonging to Gv are strict pairwise stable
networks. So, strict pairwise farsighted stability re￿nes the notion of strict pairwise
stability under Y ce. However, this proposition does not hold under the notion of
(weak) pairwise farsighted stability. Consider a situation with ￿ve players where
the payo⁄s to players in networks of the types gc = f12;23;45g and gd = f12;45g
are, respectively, Y1(gc) = Y2(gc) = Y3(gc) = Y4(gc) = Y5(gc) = 10 and Y1(gd) =
Y2(gd) = Y4(gd) = Y5(gd) = 10;Y3(gd) = 0 (see right part of Figure 7), while in all
other networks payo⁄s are equal to zero. Under the above algorithm, Gv consists
25of all networks of the types gc and gd, but there is a (weak) farsighted improving
path from gd to gc. Using Jackson￿ s algorithm would not help in recovering the
proposition.13 For instance, consider a situation with six players where the payo⁄s
to players in networks of the types ga = f12;23;45;56g and gb = f12;34;56g are
equal to 10 (see left part of Figure 7), while in all other networks payo⁄s are equal
to zero. Jackson￿ s algorithm would only select the networks of the type ga while















































































Figure 7 : Strict versus weak pairwise farsighted stability.
Six players Five players
Finally, consider a situation with ￿ve players where the payo⁄s to players in
networks of the type ge = f12;23;45g are Y1(ge) = Y2(ge) = Y3(ge) = 10, Y4(ge) =
Y5(ge) = 5 while in all other networks payo⁄s are equal to zero. The set of strongly
e¢ cient networks consists of networks of the type ge and is the unique strict pairwise
farsightedly stable set. However, v does not satisfy top convexity. Thus, under the
notion of strict pairwise farsighted stability, top convexity is not necessary to sustain
the set of strongly e¢ cient networks as the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set.
13Jackson (2005) has proposed an alternative algorithm which is a bit di⁄erent since it requires
to pick the maximal number of links in the de￿nition of each hk. Under a component additive
v, a network de￿ned by Jackson￿ s algorithm is pairwise stable and Pareto e¢ cient under the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule Y ce.
267 Conclusion
We have studied the stability of social and economic networks when players are
farsighted. In particular, we have ￿rst examined whether the networks formed by
farsighted players are di⁄erent from those formed by myopic players in Jackson and
Wolinsky￿ s (1996) symmetric connections model, in Corominas-Bosch￿ s (2004) model
of trading networks with bilateral bargaining, and in Kranton and Minehart￿ s (2001)
model of buyer-seller networks. We have then provided some primitive conditions
on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks
is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian
allocation rule, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks and the set of pairwise (my-
opically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique
pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.
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